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I. INTRODUCTION 
Amazon designed the virtual personal assistant, Alexa, and 
programmed the virtual assistant in millions of Alexa-enabled devices, 
creating a large class of smart devices that now reside in American 
homes and offices.1  However, any convenience gained from Alexa-
enabled devices, such as Amazon’s Echo device, creates significant 
privacy concerns.  Engagement with an Alexa-enabled smart home 
device puts the user at risk of exposing personal and incriminating data 
to law enforcement even before they obtain a search warrant based on 
probable cause.  Of significant concern is that the Supreme Court of 
the United States has not ruled on whether it is constitutional for law 
enforcement to obtain Alexa-enabled smart home data without a 
warrant supported by probable cause. 
Recently, law enforcement used the recordings from Alexa-
enabled smart home devices in at least three criminal case 
investigations.  A judge in New Hampshire ordered Amazon to release 
recordings from an Alexa-enabled Echo device located in a home 
 
1 Ben Fox Rubin, Amazon sees Alexa Devices More Than Double in Just One Year, C|NET 
(Jan. 6, 2020, 6:00 a.m.), https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-sees-alexa-devices-more-than-
double-in-just-one-year/.  
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where two women were fatally stabbed.2  In a similar case, the 
defendant, under criminal investigation, voluntarily gave up the 
recordings from the Alexa-enabled Echo device.3  In other situations, 
law enforcement obtained warrants for the recordings from Alexa-
enabled Echo devices located in homes.4  While the government’s use 
of Alexa-enabled smart home data in criminal prosecution proceedings 
is not yet prevalent, the use of this data without constitutional restraints 
poses significant privacy concerns.  
The framers of the United States Constitution did not have 
reason to develop law concerning the government’s use of smart 
technology to acquire, store, and analyze personal information about 
Americans.5  When the founding fathers drafted and ratified the 
Constitution, there were no electronic devices such as satellites, digital 
cameras, and computers.  Today, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 
provide the velocity, location, and time of cars and airplanes.6  A Ford 
Motor representative stated, “[w]e know everyone who breaks the law. 
We know when you’re doing it. We have GPS in your car, so we know 
what you’re doing.”7  Recently, the Supreme Court recognized the 
growth of cellphone use by stating, “[t]here are 396 million cell phone 
service accounts in the United States . . . for a Nation of 326 million 
people.”8  Furthermore, the current Alexa-enabled smart home devices 
transmit data displaying continuous and intimate patterns of users’ 
routines, habits, thoughts, and other daily life activities.  Thus, 
 
2 Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Orders Amazon to Provide Echo recordings in Double 




4 Kayla Epstein, Police Think Amazon’s Alexa May Have Information on a Fatal Stabbing 
Case, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/02/police-think-amazons-alexa-may-
have-information-fatal-stabbing-case/. 
5 See Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51 
IDAHO L. REV. 639, 641 (2015) (“These devices will send data from the device in the home 
out to the cloud, leaving their private nature uncertain, and many others will be designed to 
operate outside the home, like driverless cars, wearables, and smart retailers.”). 
6 What is GPS and How Does it Work?, MEDALLION GPS (Jul. 19, 2018), 
https://medalliongps.com/blogs/medallion-car-tracking-and-protection/what-is-gps-and-how-
does-it-work. 
7 Stephen E. Henderson, Our Records Panopticon and the American Bar Association 
Standards for Criminal Justice, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 705 (2014). 
8 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
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technology has rapidly advanced since the enactment of the 
Constitution.  
Law enforcement’s unchecked access to Alexa-enabled smart 
home devices contravenes the framers’ intent to protect Americans 
from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures, notably within 
one’s home.  The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
is a response to the “‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which 
allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained 
search for evidence of criminal activity.”9  As a result, the framers of 
the Constitution created specific guidelines to administer search 
warrants in the United States.  
Contrary to England’s “colonial writs of assistance,”10 the 
Fourth Amendment requires specificity to execute search warrants.  
Alexa-enabled smart home devices continue to grow in sophistication, 
and whether law enforcement’s use of this data is constitutional 
requires an examination of the Fourth Amendment.   
This Note addresses how the Fourth Amendment should 
protect data collected from Alexa-enabled smart home devices against 
unlawful governmental search and seizure.  Specifically, this Note 
analyzes Supreme Court cases discussing technological advancements 
and demonstrates how current federal law can protect Alexa-enabled 
smart home devices.  This Note also demonstrates how redefining the 
Fourth Amendment’s term “effects” can expand its scope to protect 
Alexa-enabled smart home devices and the data they radiate.  Also, 
this Note analyzes Andrew Ferguson’s theory of digital curtilage11 and 
shows how this new framework can be used by judges to protect the 
data collected from Alexa-enabled smart home devices.  
This Note is divided into seven parts.  Part II of this Note 
discusses the societal benefits derived from the Alexa-enabled smart 
home device.  Part III focuses exclusively on Supreme Court cases 
regarding the Fourth Amendment and its application towards different 
electronic devices.  Part IV demonstrates how current federal law can 
protect Alexa-enabled smart home devices from unreasonable searches 
or seizures.  Part V shows how redefining the Fourth Amendment’s 
term “effect” can expand its scope to protect Alexa-enabled smart 
devices.  Part VI presents the theory of “digital curtilage” and discusses 
 
9 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). 
10 Id. 
11 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 
104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 809 (2016). 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2020], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss2/12
2020 A NEW ERA: DIGITAL CURTILAGE 667 
how this new framework can protect Alexa-enabled smart devices and 
the data they radiate.  Lastly, Part VII concludes with a summary of 
the methods used in this Note to protect Alexa-enabled smart home 
devices from unlawful government intrusion.   
II. SOCIETY’S BENEFITS DERIVED FROM THE ALEXA-ENABLED 
SMART HOME DEVICE 
A. A New Form of Electronic Surveillance   
1. What is a smart device? 
At this rate, any tangible property can become smart by merely 
adding sensors, and “a tiny bit of computing capabilities and network 
connectivity.”12  Amazon’s Alexa-enabled home device falls under a 
category of smart devices.  A smart device is “a context-aware 
electronic device capable of performing autonomous computing and 
connecting to other devices…wirelessly for data exchange.”13  Smart 
devices possess features of “context-awareness, autonomous 
computing, and connectivity.”14  Context-awareness is “the ability of 
a system . . . to gather information about its environment at any given 
time and adapt behaviors accordingly.”15  Autonomous computing is a 
device’s ability to “perform[sic] tasks autonomously without the direct 
command of the user.”16  The connectivity feature refers to a smart 
device’s ability to connect wirelessly to a data network and cloud 
system.17  The cloud stores data on an offsite location: 
[The cloud is an] internet data center where software 
and services reside, instead of being stored on local 
hardware such as your computer or other electronic 
devices. Cloud computing harnesses the power of the 
internet to outsource tasks, such as housing software or 
file storage. Cloud storage refers to the process of 
saving data to an offsite storage system not found on 
 
12 Manuel Silverio, What is a Smart Device?- The Key Concept of the Internet of 








Sanchez: A New Era: Digital Curtilage
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
668 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
your electronic device. This isn’t saving items to a 
folder on your desktop or transferring items onto a 
thumb drive. Cloud storage systems are maintained by 
a third party, and you save your files to a remote 
database thanks to the power of the internet. This allows 
you to backup and access your files from any device 
that is connected to the internet.18 
 
As an alternative to buying external hard drives, cloud storage is 
convenient and cost-effective. 
2. What is a voice recognition device? 
Voice recognition is “the technology by which sounds, words 
or phrases spoken by humans are converted into electrical signals, and 
these signals are transformed into coding patterns to which meaning 
has been assigned.”19  Voice recognition technology created a voice 
assistant industry where software developers use artificial intelligence 
and machine learning capabilities to improve their voice recognition 
devices.   
Voice recognition devices have evolved throughout the years 
and continue to evolve as devices need updating.20  In 1961, IBM 
introduced the IBM Shoebox as the first digital speech recognition 
technology, recognizing 16 words.21  In 2011, Apple introduced Siri.22  
In 2013, Microsoft introduced Cortana.23  In 2014, Amazon introduced 
 









19 Jim Baumann, Voice Recognition, HUMAN INTERFACE TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, 
http://www.hitl.washington.edu/projects/knowledge_base/virtual-
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Alexa.24  In 2017, Google launched Google Home with multi-user 
support to recognize six different voices.25 
Amazon created Alexa, an artificial intelligence system, to 
engage and understand humans.26  The Alexa-enabled Echo device is 
a smart home device that features voice recognition.  The ability to 
engage and understand humans requires smart devices to learn about 
its user’s likes and dislikes, habits, and much more.  
3. The Alexa-enabled Echo device assists law 
enforcement 
Richard Clarke created the expression “dataveillance to define 
the systematic observation, collation, and dissemination that modern 
computing make[s] possible.”27  Smart devices possess an ever-
increasing capacity to record intimate information by “the combined 
impact of an increased ability to collect[,] process[,] and disseminate 
information.”28  By design, smart home devices also gather sensitive 
information about their owner and store it in the cloud system.29  
Amazon’s Alexa-enabled Echo device continuously records and 
collects data about the user’s life to produce efficient and convenient 
virtual assistance.30   
The Alexa-enabled Echo device also creates the potential for 
law enforcement to obtain this accumulation of information and use it 
against the user.  For example, a judge in New Hampshire ordered 
Amazon to release recordings from an Echo device during a criminal 
investigation.31  Amazon’s Alexa-enabled Echo device activates with 
the wake word Alexa when it begins to record and save the data 
collected.32  Considering the smart home device’s capacity to store 
incriminating information, gaining access to the data collected 




26 George Anders, ”Alexa, Understand Me”, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608571/alexa-understand-me/. 
27 M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology 
Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 822 (2010). 
28 Id. 
29 The Mystery of the Amazon Echo Data, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/2819/mystery-amazon-echo-data. 
30 Id. 
31 Weiss, supra note 2. 
32 Id. 
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Echo device could have activated at the time of the crime.33  However, 
an Amazon spokesperson said, “no information [would] be released 
until the company [was] served with a valid legal demand.”34  This 
case demonstrates law enforcement’s growing interest in obtaining the 
data collected from the Alexa-enabled smart home device.   
Moreover, in a similar case, a prosecutor sought the recordings 
from the defendant’s Alexa-enabled Echo smart speaker as evidence 
in a criminal investigation.35  Since Amazon’s Echo device works by 
endlessly listening for the wake word Alexa, the device records the 
voice of the user even without his knowledge.  Hence, the voice-
activated Echo device could potentially provide information about the 
incident.36  Amazon’s lawyers wrote a memo seeking to quash the 
prosecutor’s request for a search warrant by arguing that the First 
Amendment protected the recorded speech.37  Subsequently, the 
defendant voluntarily gave up the recordings from his Alexa-enabled 
smart device, which led Amazon to provide prosecutors with the 
recorded data.38  This scenario demonstrates that when a user of 
Amazon’s Alexa-enabled smart home device voluntarily consents to 
share the information gathered by the smart device, he waives his 
privacy rights.  
Recently, Amazon commented on its compliance with the 
governmental demands of the Alexa-enabled Echo smart device.39  
Turning over the data to law enforcement depends on whether the 
government provides a lawful court order requiring the disclosure.40  
In 2019, police obtained a warrant for the recordings from Alexa-
enabled Echo devices that were in a house during the time a murder 
ensued.41  In justifying the probable cause standard for the execution 
of a warrant, police officers wrote, “[i]t is believed that evidence of 
crimes, audio recordings capturing the attack on victim Silvia Crespo 
that occurred in the main bedroom … may be found on the server 
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In reply, an Amazon representative stated, “…the company 
does not disclose customer information in response to government 
demands unless we’re required to do so to comply with a legally valid 
and binding order[;] the company objects to overbroad or otherwise 
inappropriate demands as a matter of course.”43  However, a 
spokesman for the Hallandale Beach Police Department later stated, 
“we did receive [the Alexa-enabled Echo device] recordings, and we 
are in the process of analyzing the information that was sent to us.”44  
It appears from this case that Amazon believes in both the spirit of the 
Fourth Amendment and its text when asked by the government to 
disclose the data collected from Alexa-enabled smart home devices.  
A District Court also followed the spirit of the Fourth 
Amendment and its text regarding the disclosure of data collected from 
Alexa-enabled smart home devices in United States v. Chiu.45  Chiu, 
the defendant, moved to suppress the evidence seized from his 
residence, conducted according to a warrant.46  The evidence seized 
included an Alexa-enabled Echo device that officers believed 
contained child pornography.47  The court denied the motion to 
suppress the evidence because “the search warrant affidavit provided 
probable cause that evidence of a crime, particularly possession or 
receipt of child pornography, would be found in Chiu’s residence.”48   
Moreover, the state court considered the officer’s expertise in 
knowing the habits of child pornography consumers for the issuance 
of a search warrant.49  Child pornography consumers “maintain their 
digital or electronic collections in a safe, secure, and private 
environment . . . kept close by . . . to enable the individual to view or 
access the material, and to safeguard it.”50  Considering this 
information, the judge denied Chiu’s motion to suppress.51  This case 
shows how some courts apply the Fourth Amendment to protect Alexa-
enabled smart home devices and the data it stores.  Since the Supreme 




45 United States v. Chiu, No. CR 18-10431-DJC, 2019 WL 3755953, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 
8, 2019). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 2*. 
48 Id. at 3*. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 4*. 
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enabled smart home devices, lower courts create inconsistent results 
regarding smart home devices and governmental searches and 
seizures.   
As provided by law, securing a search warrant requires law 
enforcement to obtain a written order signed by a court authorizing the 
officer to conduct a search or seizure.  Warrants are precise and 
authorize law enforcement officers to search in particular locations and 
seize specific items.  Governmental searches and seizures performed 
without a valid warrant are deemed presumptively invalid.52  Courts 
generally suppress evidence obtained from governmental searches and 
seizure conducted without a warrant unless a court finds that the search 
was reasonable under the circumstances.53          
4. Electronic devices improve law enforcement 
investigations 
Consumers’ use of smart home devices leaves behind a digital 
footprint that can be utilized in government investigations as police 
recognize the value of digital surveillance.54  In the past, evidence at a 
crime scene included blood, fingerprints, footmarks, fabric from a 
shirt, and hair.  However, technological advancements created virtual 
evidence that derives from computers, cell phones, watches, and more.  
For instance, law enforcement officials use the data collected from 
Fitbits55 activity trackers to Ring56 doorbells for help in their 
 
52 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1925). 
53 Id. at 149: 
If the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, 
that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to 
the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which 
by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are 
valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was 
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a 
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and 
rights of individual citizens. 
Id.  
54 Epstein, supra note 4. 
55 Fitbit Privacy Policy, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/us/legal/privacy-policy (Effective 
Dec. 18, 2019) (explaining Fitbit’s ability to collect data to estimate a variety of metrics like 
the number of steps users take, their distance traveled, calories burned, heart rate, sleep stages, 
and location.  When a user’s Fitbit syncs with Fitbit’s applications and software, the data 
recorded from the user’s Fitbit is transferred to Fitbit’s servers.). 
56 Amanda Derrick, What is the Ring Doorbell and How Does it Work?, LIFEWIRE (May 8, 
2020), https://www.lifewire.com/how-ring-doorbell-works-4583925 (explaining how Ring 
10
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investigations.57  Officers might use a Fitbit to discredit a suspect’s 
alibi by using the Fitbit data to show he was out walking instead of 
sleeping.   
Moreover, Ring openly partnered with police and “allows law 
enforcement to access the camera feeds captured and transmitted by 
their devices.”58  The camera footage from Ring doorbells can create a 
new kind of neighborhood watch.  However, “Ring does not disclose 
customer information in response to government demands unless [it is] 
required to do so to comply with a legally valid and binding order.”59  
Like Amazon, Ring requires law enforcement to obtain a search 
warrant based on probable cause to access the footage from its device.  
Additionally, law enforcement officers use Live Scan,60 which 
captures fingerprints electronically and checks the marks against a 
national database.61  Live Scan then alerts law enforcement officers to 
suspects that have provided false identification information.62  Live 
Scan helps officers collect accurate information about a person’s past 
encounter with law enforcement and biographic information.  
Law enforcement officers are interested in digital surveillance 
because physical location and time, among other information, are 
essential in investigating a crime.63  Smart devices can identify 
suspects near a crime scene through geolocation information, which 
can result in the discredit of a suspect’s recollection of facts.64  The use 
 
doorbells detect and capture video of motion, which instantly sends a push notification to the 
user’s device and stores the footage in the cloud with a subscription). 
57 Epstein, supra note 54. 
58 Id. 
59 Drew Harwell, Doorbell-camera firm Ring has partnered with 400 police forces, 
extending surveillance concerns, THE WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-has-
partnered-with-police-forces-extending-surveillance-reach/?arc404=true.  
60 What is Electronic “Live Scan” Fingerprinting Technology?, ACCURATE BIOMETRICS, 
https://accuratebiometrics.com/what-is-livescan (last visited May 23, 2020) (describing Live 
Scan as an electronic means of capturing fingerprints in a digitized format, which transmit the 
data to a state repository or the FBI to be searched against criminal databases.  By processing 
fingerprints electronically, a person’s criminal history background can be provided within a 
matter of hours.). 
61 Julie Mennell & Ian Shaw, Science and Technology at the Crime Scene, MEASUREMENT 
CONTROL (Apr. 2005), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/002029400503800301. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Forensic Analysis of Mobile Malware, SCIENCEDIRECT 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/mobile-device-forensics (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2020). 
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of technological devices for investigation purposes will continue to 
increase as technology becomes more pervasive in society.  
Amazon’s most recent information request report, which 
covers July 2019 through December 2019, demonstrates that the 
company received 1,841 subpoenas and 440 search warrants and 
turned over some or all of the information requested.65  Alex Ferguson 
considered the danger of obtaining a user’s Alexa-enabled smart home 
devices: 
Because Alexa is only supposed to activate and record 
when given a specific voice command, it was unclear 
whether obtaining a blanket warrant to examine a 
device’s transmissions could amount to a “fishing 
expedition.”  We live in a world where we have these 
little digital spies listening to us in our homes, in our 
cars, and in our phones.  It is going to become pretty 
commonplace that law enforcement is going to request 
as much digital evidence as they can about us using the 
legal means available. We have really created a 
privacy-invasive world because of consumer 
convenience.66 
Thus, although smart home devices benefit consumers, they may also 
be abused by law enforcement.  
B. Amazon’s Alexa Proves Beneficial to Consumers   
In-home connectivity has become a significant selling point for 
homeowners.  Amazon designed the voice-controlled personal 
assistant “Alexa” to serve as the control center to transform homes into 
smart homes.  The Alexa-enabled smart home device, Echo, is a 
speaker powered by cloud-based software that allows users to query 
“Alexa” to perform tasks, obtain information, and control other in-
home smart devices.  Since Alexa is a virtual assistant, just as any 
assistant, the information received is recorded.  Consequently, Alexa-
enabled devices record and collect information that viewed together 
can reveal an enormous amount of detailed information about the user.   
As a virtual assistant, Alexa becomes more efficient when 
connected to other smart devices.  For example, smart lighting lets 
 
65 AMAZON INFORMATION REQUEST REPORT 
https://d1.awsstatic.com/certifications/Information_Request_Report_December_2019.pdf. 
66 Epstein, supra note 4. 
12
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users control connected lights by voice when paired with Alexa.67  
Smart plugs also help users turn their everyday appliances into part of 
their smart home.68  By using smart plugs and connecting them with 
Alexa, users can “keep track of [their] electricity consumption with an 
energy-monitoring smart plug.”69  Users can also keep an eye on their 
homes by connecting smart cameras to Alexa.  By pairing these 
devices, users can instantly monitor the inside and outside of their 
homes from work.70   
Alexa personalizes its contents for each user by recognizing a 
user’s unique voice, which allows the device to personalize the content 
shown.71  The smart home device connects users to their personalized 
choice of entertainment.  For instance, Alexa can individualize a user’s 
daily news updates.  Users can also create routines using Alexa to 
synchronize their habits with Alexa’s actions.72  A routine is Alexa’s 
ability to perform a series of actions with a single command.73  For 
example, a user can say, “Alexa, start my day” so that Alexa responds 
by announcing the weather forecast, turning on the kitchen lights, and 
reading the news out loud.74  
Alexa, as a virtual assistant, keeps users organized and 
prepared for their daily activities.  Alexa can access a user’s “calendar 
or email from Google, G Suite, iCloud, Outlook.com, or Office 365,”75 
and the user can ask Alexa to add events to his calendar.  Without 
touching any device, users can go through a day’s worth of emails 
 












4a1a-8e17-c735780ef269&pf_rd_i=17934672011 (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
72 Alexa Features: Smart Home, supra note 67. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 




4a1a-8e17-c735780ef269&pf_rd_i=17934672011 (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
13
Sanchez: A New Era: Digital Curtilage
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
676 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
before their coffee is ready because Alexa can even read the user’s 
emails out loud.76  Alexa also tells users the traffic conditions and 
informs users about the duration of their commute.77  Alexa further 
enables users to communicate with others outside the home in over 150 
countries worldwide.78  
A significant development in the Alexa-enabled smart home 
device is its ability to handle and access health information.  Amazon 
created a way for companies to transmit information like medical 
diagnosis and pharmaceutical prescriptions via Alexa while remaining 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
compliant.79  Amazon invited health care companies to develop voice 
programs which Amazon refers to as “skills.”80  The head of Alexa 
Heath and Wellness stated, “[t]hese new skills are designed to help 
customers manage a variety of healthcare needs at home [by] simply 
using voice . . . whether it’s booking a medical appointment, accessing 
hospital post-discharge instructions, checking on the status of a 
prescription delivery, and more.”81  
Recently, the Mayo Clinic launched a new “skill” for Alexa-
enabled smart home devices to conveniently inform users of newly 
developed information about the COVID-19 pandemic.82  When users 
enable the Mayo Clinic Answers on the COVID-19 skill, they can 
receive information from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and Mayo Clinic experts.83  A Mayo Clinic physician stated 
the new skill “offers the latest information on symptoms, prevention 
[,]and how to cope in a hands-free way using only the voice – a fact 
that is especially important when we’re trying to reduce the spread of 
 
76 Id. 
77 Alexa Features: News & Information, supra note 71. 




4a1a-8e17-c735780ef269&pf_rd_i=17934672011 (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).  
79 Angela Chen, Amazon’s Alexa Now Handles Patient Health Information, THE VERGE, 




82 Coronavirus Updates: Mayo Clinic Launches New Covid-19 Information Skill For 
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the virus transmitted by physical contact.”84  Consequently, Alexa-
enabled devices record and collect information that viewed together 
can reveal an enormous amount of detailed information about the user.   
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
The Supreme Court regularly addresses advances in modern 
technology and, when necessary, enlarges the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection.85  The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures to prevent officials from arbitrary and oppressive 
interference with an individual’s privacy.86  Search and seizure are 
essential terms of art in the Fourth Amendment because they are 
threshold elements to determine whether law enforcement’s action 
constitutes a violation of the law.  According to previous Supreme 
Court case law, the location and classification of an electronic device 
are fundamental in determining whether law enforcement committed a 
Fourth Amendment search.87  For many years, courts have adjudicated 
matters about data stored on electronic devices.88  However, the Court 
has not addressed data collected and recorded by Alexa-enabled smart 
home devices.  
A. 1928: Wiretap 
Olmstead v. United States89 concerned the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to warrantless wiretapping by government agents.  
 
84 Id. 
85 See Marjorie A. Shields, Fourth Amendment Protections, and Equivalent State 
Constitutional Protections, as Applied to the Use of GPS Technology, Transponder, or the 
Like, to Monitor Location and Movement of Motor Vehicle, Aircraft, or Watercraft, 5 A.L.R. 
6th 385 (Originally published in 2005).   
86 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976). 
87 See James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A 
Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317 (2002). 
88 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378-79 (2014) (smartphones); United States 
v. Warchak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (email); United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 
994 (9th Cir. 2006) (laptop); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(computer); United States v. Barth. 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that 
the “Fourth Amendment protection of closed computer files and hard drives is similar to the 
protection it affords a person’s closed containers and closed personal effects.”); See generally 
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,542 (2005) 
(noting that computers store “a tremendous amount of information that most users do not know 
about and cannot control.”).  
89 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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Here, federal officers used wiretaps to intercept Olmstead’s telephone 
conversations.90  The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment 
protects houses and offices from which the conversations arose against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, but only from physical 
trespasses.91  The Court determined that officers secured the evidence 
solely by using their sense of hearing.92  The  Court did not consider 
wiretaps, used to listen to Olmstead’s conversations, as a physical 
trespass because officers installed the wiretaps on telephone lines 
outside Olmstead’s property.93  The Court stated, “the intervening 
wires are not part of [the defendant’s] house [or] office any more than 
are the highways along which they are stretched.”94  Looking inside a 
house from across the street with one’s eyes through binoculars or 
using one’s ears to listen to conversations inside a house was not 
classified as a physical trespass onto a person’s home, a 
constitutionally protected area. 
Furthermore, the Court viewed conversations as intangible and 
not constitutionally protected.95  Finding that speech was not classified 
property within the Fourth Amendment’s context, the Court 
determined that wiretapping did not constitute a search or seizure to 
trigger the Fourth Amendment’s protection.96  The Court’s decision 
demonstrated that the Fourth Amendment’s application depended on 
whether law enforcement trespassed on a suspect’s constitutionally 
protected property.  Since the Court decided that conversations and 
telephone line wires on a public street were not constitutionally 
protected property or areas under the Fourth Amendment, there was no 
constitutional violation.  
B. 1961: Spike Mike 
Silverman v. United States97 concerned the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to warrantless use of a spike mike by government 
agents.  A spike mike “was a microphone with a spike about a foot 
long attached to it together with an amplifier, a power pack, and 
 
90 Id. at 456-57. 
91 Id. at 466. 
92 Id. at 457. 
93 Id. at 466. 
94 Id. at 465. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 466. 
97 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
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earphones.”98  In this case, officers pushed a spike mike through a 
neighboring house until it touched the heating ducts occupied by the 
defendant’s house.99  The officers then heard the defendant’s 
conversations from the second and first floors through the spike mike 
earphones.100   
In determining whether law enforcement violated the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right, the Court moved away from its 
decision in Olmstead101 and decided that it was unnecessary to show 
an actual governmental trespass.102  The Court did not need to examine 
whether there was a taking of physical property.103  The Court stressed 
that “inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable 
in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.”104  The Court 
instead relied on the personal rights that the Fourth Amendment 
secures.105  At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the “right 
of a man to retreat into his own home, and there be free from 
unreasonable government intrusion.”106  The Court indicated it has 
“never held that a federal officer may without [a] warrant and without 
consent physically entrench into a man’s office or home, there secretly 
observe or listen, and relate at the man’s subsequent criminal trial what 
was seen and heard.”107  The Court held the actual intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area, the defendant’s home, was effected 
without the owner’s knowledge or consent.108  Consequently, there was 
no need to determine whether a technical trespass under property law 
occurred relating to the defendant’s wall.109  Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court was preparing to look beyond the property right, trespass 
analysis applied in Olmstead.110   
 
98  Id. at 506. 
99  Id. at 506-07. 
100 Id. 
101 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
102 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 510. 
103 Id. at 511. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 512. 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 511. 
110 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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C. 1967: Electronic Listening and Recording Devices 
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided a landmark decision 
regarding the Fourth Amendment and rejected the trespass on property 
analysis from Olmstead.111  In Katz v. United States, the Court further 
elaborated on the protection of personal rights from Silverman112 by 
establishing the “reasonable expectation of privacy”113 doctrine.  
Katz114 concerned the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the 
government’s warrantless use of an electronic listening and recording 
device attached to a public telephone booth.115   
The Court asserted that the Fourth Amendment “protects 
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion.”116  
More importantly, the “Fourth Amendment protects people[,] not 
places.”117  The Court considered the advancements of technology and 
decided that the trespass doctrine constituted “bad physics as well as 
bad law.”118  The Court determined that “what a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject to 
the Fourth Amendment[‘s] protection. But what he seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”119   
In this case, although people could see Katz in the glass 
fashioned telephone booth, they could not hear his conversations.  The 
Court further stated, “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know 
that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”120  
The government agents ignored the Fourth Amendment’s requirement 
of obtaining a search warrant based on probable cause.  The Court 
reasoned that a warrant is “a constitutional precondition of the kind of 
electronic surveillance involved in this case.”121 
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion determined that the 
protection derived from the Fourth Amendment depends on a person’s 
 
111 Id. 
112 See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505. 
113 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 349-50. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 351. 
118 Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
119 Id. at 351. (internal citations omitted). 
120 Id. at 359. 
121 Id. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy.122  Justice Harlan stated that a 
person’s home is “a place where he expects privacy, but objects, 
activities or statements that he exposes to the plain view of outsiders 
are not protected because no intention to keep them to himself has been 
exhibited.”123  Similarly, “conversations in the open would not be 
protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under 
the circumstances would be unreasonable.”124   
In this case, Justice Harlan reasoned that when Katz shut the 
door of the booth and paid to make his phone call, he was entitled to 
assume that his conversations were private.125  Justice Harlan viewed 
the telephone booth as “a temporarily private place whose momentary 
occupants’ expectations of freedom from [government] intrusion[s] 
are recognized as reasonable.”126  Thus, surveillance of a person’s 
conversations in a public telephone booth was unreasonable, absent a 
search warrant.    
D. 2001: Thermal Imaging Device  
Kyllo v. United States127 concerned the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to the government’s warrantless use of a sense-
enhancing device aimed at a private home from a public street. 128  In 
this case, agents suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana in his home, 
which required high-intensity lamps.129  Agents used an Agema 
Thermovision 210130 thermal imager device to scan Kyllo’s home to 
detect infrared radiation that was invisible to the naked eye.131  The 
thermal imager device operated like a “video camera showing heat 
images.”132  Kyllo’s home scan took only a few minutes, and the agent 
 
122 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
123 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). 
125 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). 
126 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). 
127 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
128 Id. at 29. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. (describing the Agema Thermovision 210 as a thermal imager, which detects infrared 
radiation which generally all objects emit but is not visible to the naked eye.  The thermal 
imager converts the infrared radiation into images based on relative warmth. Black signifies 
that the area is cool, white shows the area is hot.  Shades of gray suggest relative temperature 
differences.  The thermal imager operates like a video camera showing heat images.). 
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 30. 
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obtained this data sitting across the street from the front of Kyllo’s 
house.133  The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a sidewall 
of Kyllo’s home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home 
and substantially warmer than neighboring homes.134  
The Court stated, “[a]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment 
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”135  The Court understood 
the concern over technological advancements and its impact on 
privacy rights by saying, “the rule we adopt must take account of more 
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”136  
The Court stated, “all details [from houses] are intimate details, 
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”137  
The agent obtained details of how warm Kyllo heated his home, and 
the details were intimate because it was data collected from the 
home.138  The Court stated, “[w]hile it is certainly possible to conclude 
from the videotape of the thermal imaging [device] that…no 
significant compromise of the homeowner’s privacy [occurred], we 
must take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment forward.”139  Thus, the government’s surveillance by a 
thermal-image device, which collected details of the home that were 
not visible without entering the home, was a search and was 
unreasonable without a warrant.140  
E. 2012: GPS 
United States v. Jones141 concerned the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to the government’s use of a GPS tracking device 
without a valid warrant.142  In Jones, government officials acquired a 
warrant to expire in ten days that authorized installing a GPS device 
on the car registered to Jone’s wife in the District of Columbia.143  On 
 
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted.) 
136 Id. at 36. 
137 Id. at 37. 
138 Id. at 38. 
139 Id. at 40. 
140 Id. 
141 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 402-03. 
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the eleventh day, government officials installed the GPS tracking 
device on the car’s undercarriage in Maryland without a valid, legally 
binding warrant.144  Over the next twenty-eight days, government 
officials used the device to track the car’s movements.145  Officials also 
replaced the GPS’s battery located on the car.146   
The Court recognized that “[b]y means of signals from multiple 
satellites, the device established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 
feet, and communicated that location by cellular phone to a 
Government computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of data over 
the 4-week period.”147  The Court stated, “[i]t is beyond dispute that a 
vehicle is an “effect” as that term is used in the Amendment.”148  Here, 
law enforcement physically occupied private property and obtained 
incriminating information.149  Thus, the government’s installation of 
the GPS device on the car to monitor its movements constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.150   
In reaching its decision, the Court considered the framers’ 
intent in drafting the Constitution.  The Court stated, “[t]he text of the 
Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since 
otherwise[,] it would have referred simply to the right of the people to 
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.”151  The Court 
reasoned that Jones possessed the car, “at the time the Government 
trespassorily inserted the information gathering [GPS] device.”152  
Here, the Court focused on the prior property-based trespassory 
analysis of the Fourth Amendment.  However, the Court did state, “we 
do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely 
the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain 
subject to the [reasonable expectation of privacy] analysis.”153 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion emphasized that the 
Fourth Amendment did not only apply to government trespassory 
intrusions on private property.154  The reasonable expectation of 
 
144 Id. at 403. 
145 Id.  
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 404. 
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 405 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
152 Id. at 410. 
153  Id. at 411. 
154 Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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privacy analysis “augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the 
common-law trespassory test that preceded it.”155  Justice Sotomayor 
stated, “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy.”156  Considering that “GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s 
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations[,]”157 it is 
clear that officers need warrants to obtain this data.  Furthermore, GPS 
monitoring is “cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance 
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the 
ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices.”158   
More importantly, Justice Sotomayor thought it might “be 
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed 
to third parties.”159  Justice Sotomayor believed the third party doctrine 
was “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying 
out mundane tasks.”160  Justice Sotomayor determined that consumers 
of electronic devices “can attain constitutionally protected status only 
if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a 
prerequisite for privacy.”161  She further stated, “I would not assume 
that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public 
for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.”162  Justice Sotomayor acknowledged the 
growing concern that people who use electronic devices might be left 
unprotected under the law.   
F. 2014: Cell Phone 
Riley v. California163 concerned the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment to the government’s search of cell phones without a 
warrant.  In Riley, an officer confiscated Riley’s “smart phone, a cell 
 
155 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
156 Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
157 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
158 Id. at 415-16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
159 Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
160 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
161 Id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
162 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
163 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
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phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced 
computing capability, large storage capacity[,] and Internet 
connectivity.”164  Without a warrant, the officer searched the cell 
phone.165 
Here, the Court considered that “cell phones differ in both a 
quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be 
kept on an arrestee’s person.”166  Cell phones are “minicomputers that 
also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.”167  The 
Court acknowledged that a distinguishable feature of modern cell 
phones is their immense storage capacity.168  Before cell phones, a 
search of a person resulted in gathering limited information that 
“constituted only a narrow intrusion on privacy.”169  However, 
technology advanced to the degree where law enforcement can obtain 
detailed information about the owner of the cell phone: 
Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they 
have received for the past several months, every picture 
they have taken, or every book or article they have 
read–nor would they have any reason to attempt to do 
so. And if they did, they would have to drag behind 
them a trunk of the sort held to require a search 
warrant…rather than a container the size of the 
cigarette package.170  
Therefore, the investigations of cell phones reveal more detailed 
information about an arrestee then ever before. 
The Court determined that law enforcement’s intrusion into 
privacy is no longer physically limited due to cell phones. For 
example, cell phone technology translates millions of “pages of text, 
thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.”171  Also, “even the most 
basic phones that sell for less than $20 might hold photographs, picture 
messages, text messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, a 
thousand-entry phone book, and so on.”172  The Court noted, it is no 
 
164 Id. at 379. 
165 Id.  
166 Id. at 393. 
167 Id.  
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 393-94. 
171 Id. at 394. 
172 Id.  
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exaggeration to say that about “90% of American adults who own a 
cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect 
of their lives–from the mundane to the intimate.”173 
Obtaining cell phone data differs from physical evidence not 
only in quantity but also in quality.  “An Internet search and browsing 
history, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled phone and 
[can] reveal an individual’s private interest or concerns–perhaps a 
search for certain symptoms of [a] disease, coupled with frequent visits 
to WebMD [will show a user’s worry over an illness.]”174  The Court 
also considered users’ ability to download other applications onto their 
phones: 
Mobile application software on a cell phone, or “apps,” 
offer a range of tools for managing detailed information 
about all aspects of a person’s life. There are apps for 
Democratic Party news and Republican Party news; 
apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps 
for sharing prayer requests; apps for tracking pregnancy 
symptoms; apps for planning your budget; apps for 
every conceivable hobby or pastime; apps for 
improving your romantic life. There are popular apps 
for buying or selling just about anything, and the 
records of such transactions may be accessible on the 
phone indefinitely. There are over a million apps 
available in each of the two major app stores; the phrase 
“there’s an app for that” is now part of the popular 
lexicon. The average smart phone user has installed 33 
apps, which together can form a revealing montage of 
the user’s life.175   
A single cell phone could give officials access to information that 
would generally require long hours of surveillance and, even then, 
would not result in readily available information as a cell  phone.  
Moreover, the data users view on their cell phones may not be 
stored on the device: 
[C]ell phones [are] used to access data located 
elsewhere, at the tap of a screen. That is what cell 
 
173 Id. at 395. 
174 Id. at 395-96. 
175 Id. at 396. 
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phones, with increasing frequency, are designed to do 
by taking advantage of ‘cloud computing.’ Cloud 
computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices 
to display data stored on remote servers rather than on 
the device itself. Cell phone users often may not know 
whether particular information is stored on the device 
or in the cloud, and it generally makes little difference. 
Moreover, the same type of data may be stored locally 
on the device for one user and in the cloud for 
another.176   
A cell phone could equip officers with information recorded at the time 
of the arrest, and information that was recorded several months or 
years ago because of cloud storage. 
The Court determined it was reasonable to expect that 
“incriminating information will be found on a phone regardless of 
when the crime occurred.”177  The Court stated that “even an individual 
pulled over for something as basic as speeding might well have 
locational data dispositive of guilt on his phone.”178  Likewise, “an 
individual pulled over for reckless driving might have evidence on the 
phone that shows whether he was texting while driving.”179 
The Court stated, “modern cell phones are not just another 
technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may 
reveal, they hold for many Americans the privacies of life.”180  The 
Court held, “the fact that technology now allows an individual to carry 
such information in his hand does not make the information any less 
worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”181  Thus, the 
Court concluded that cell phones are distinct from other physical 
material, resulting in a warrant requirement.182  The Court’s holding 
“is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it 
is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search.”183 
 
176 Id. at 397 (internal citation omitted). 
177 Id. at 399. 
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 403 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 381. 
183 Id. at 401. 
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G. 2018: Cell Site Location  
Carpenter v. United States184 concerned the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to the government’s seizure and search of cell site 
location information from cell phone companies.185  In Carpenter, 
officers obtained “12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s 
movements–an average of 101 data points per day”186 from cell phone 
companies.  Cell site location information (CSLI) is the time-stamped 
record that a phone produces when it connects to a cell site,187 radio 
antennas.188  The Court noted that “most modern devices, such as 
smartphones, tap into the wireless network several times a minute 
whenever their signal is on, even [when] the owner is not using one of 
the phone’s features.”189  
In determining whether the Fourth Amendment applied, the 
Court reviewed past cases dealing with technological advancements.  
The Court stated, “the Amendment seeks to secure the privacies of life 
against arbitrary power.”190  Also, a “central aim of the Framers was to 
place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”191  
However, this case was different from previously decided cases as 
third party cell phone companies maintained the CSLI, which did not 
fit neatly under existing precedent.192  
The Court analyzed whether the third party doctrine applied to 
CSLI, which would allow law enforcement to obtain CSLI without a 
warrant.  In past cases, the Court distinguished the application for the 
Fourth Amendment between information that people kept private and 
information shared with others.  The third party doctrine determines 
that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information 
he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”193  The law applies, “even if 
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only 
for a limited purpose.”194   
 
184 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
185 Id.  
186 Id. at 2212. 
187 Id. at 2211. 
188 Id.  
189 Id.  
190 Id. at  2214 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
191 Id.  
192 Id.  
193 Id. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)). 
194 Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
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The third party doctrine originated from United States v. 
Miller,195 where Miller could “assert neither ownership nor 
possession”196 of his bank statements since the Court determined the 
documents were part of the bank’s business records.  In Miller, the 
checks and bank statements were “not confidential communications 
but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”197  
This further showed that Miller had a limited expectation of privacy in 
those documents.  Furthermore, Miller exposed the bank statement’s 
information to bank employees in the “ordinary course of business.”198  
Thus, the Fourth Amendment did not protect Miller’s bank 
statements.199  
Additionally, the Court applied the third party doctrine in the 
context of information conveyed to a telephone company.200  In Smith 
v. Maryland,201 the Court ruled that government officials’ use of a pen 
register, a device that recorded the outgoing phone numbers dialed on 
a landline telephone, was not a search.202  Since a pen register had 
limited capabilities in its use, the Court “doubt[ed] that people[,] in 
general[,] entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers 
they dial.”203  Also, telephone subscribers knew that telephone 
companies used numbers dialed for a variety of legitimate business 
purposes, including routing calls.204  Thus, when Smith placed a call, 
he “voluntarily conveyed the dialed numbers to the phone company by 
exposing that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of 
business.”205  Thus, the Fourth Amendment did not protect the 
numbers Smith dialed.206  
However, in Carpenter’s case, the Court faced a new 
phenomenon that did not fit with past decisions: the ability to chronicle 
a person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals.  
 
195 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 435. 
196 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 440). 
197 Id. (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 440). 
198 Id. (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 442). 
199 Id. (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443). 
200 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
201 Id. 
202 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 742). 
203 Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 742). 
204 Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
205 Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 744) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
206 Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 745). 
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CSLI is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”207  Since 
users share this information with their telephone companies, the third 
party doctrine applies.  However, the Court expressly declined to apply 
the third party doctrine to cover this new circumstance.208  
Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact 
that a third party holds this information does not overcome the user’s 
claim to Fourth Amendment protection.209  The Court reasoned that 
“although [CSLI] records are generated for commercial purposes, that 
distinction does not negate Carpenter’s anticipation of privacy in his 
physical location.”210  The Court stated, “mapping a cell phone’s 
location [for] 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the 
holder’s whereabouts.”211   
In distinguishing GPS tracking with CSLI, the Court stated, “a 
cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares 
and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, 
and other potentially revealing locales.”212  More importantly, the 
Court noted that wireless carriers maintain phone records for up to five 
years.213  The continuously logged CSLI affects all cell phone users, 
not just people under investigation.214   
The Court determined that the current third party doctrine did 
not apply to CSLI.  The Court stated, “there is a world of difference 
between the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith 
and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information 
casually collected by wireless carriers today.”215  For example,  phone 
companies are not typical witnesses, unlike a “nosy neighbor.”216  
Hence, granting law enforcement access to CSLI without a warrant 
would grant a “significant extension of [the third party doctrine] to a 
distinct category of information.”217 
Likewise, users did not voluntarily share their CSLI with their 
wireless providers. The Court stated, “a cell phone logs a cell-site 
 
207 Id.  




212 Id. at 2218. 
213 Id.  
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 2219. 
216 Id.  
217 Id. 
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record by dint of its operation, without an affirmative act on the part of 
the user beyond powering up.”218 The CSLI was generated by virtually 
any activity conducted on the phone.  The Court noted that “apart from 
disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid 
leaving behind a trail of location data.”219  The Court determined that 
“in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily assume the risk of 
turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”220   
The Court held that “an individual maintains a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as 
captured through CSLI.”221  Thus, where a suspect has a legitimate 
privacy interest in records held by a third party, like CSLI, the 
government needs a warrant.222  However, in this case, the Court did 
not decide on the issue of “real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a 
download of information on all the devices connected to a particular 
cell site during a particular interval).”223   
IV. WAYS TO MOVE FORWARD: ALEXA-ENABLED SMART 
HOME DEVICES PROTECTED UNDER  CURRENT FEDERAL 
LAW  
A. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine 
Applied to Alexa-Enabled Smart Home Devices 
According to Katz,224 the Fourth Amendment applies when a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or item 
searched or seized.225  Arguably, people hold a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their Alexa-enabled smart home devices because of the 
quality and quantity of information the device records and stores.  Not 
only does the Alexa-enabled smart home device function as a 
telephone, but it also functions as a virtual assistant controlling other 
smart home devices and keeping the user organized. 
However, the Court previously determined that “what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is 
 
218 Id. at 2220. 
219 Id.  
220 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
221 Id. at 2217. 
222 Id.  
223 Id. at 2220. 
224 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
225 Id. at 351. 
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not subject to the Fourth Amendment protection.”226  Similarly, “what 
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”227  Users of Alexa-enabled smart 
home devices run the risk that Alexa is accidentally recording their 
conversation since Alexa is continuously listening for its wake word.  
What a user seeks to preserve as private might involuntarily be exposed 
to the public.  For example, if, in the privacy of their bedroom, a couple 
starts to argue and Alexa starts recording without the couple’s 
knowledge, then arguably, the couple has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the communications recorded by Alexa.   
The government might argue that users of smart home devices 
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the device or its 
recordings because they share the information with Amazon.  
However, the couple did not knowingly expose their argument to the 
public since they did not call on Alexa for assistance.  Moreover, the 
couple chose to argue in the privacy of their bedroom where no one 
can see or hear them.  The couple can claim that they had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their Alexa-enabled smart home device and 
its recordings because it accidentally recorded information about the 
owners. 
The couple would also be entitled to claim that they never 
intended their intimate conversations to be accessed so easily by the 
government.  The Supreme Court has always held that a person’s home 
is a place where he expects privacy.228  When the couple shut the front 
door of their home, they held a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
expected to be free from unlawful government intrusion.   
The Supreme Court has already found that collecting intimate 
details from within a home is a search and unreasonable.229  The data 
collected from Alexa-enabled smart home devices reveal specific 
details of the home where one holds a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  For example, when a user sets a routine on Alexa to drop the 
heating temperature and gradually turn on the lights, Alexa is 
recording the requests.  This information not only shows the electricity 
usage and heating consumption in the home but also reveals the home 
owner’s preferences.   
 
226 Id.  
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 361. 
229 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
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Government officials’ access to Alexa’s recorded transcripts 
would disclose information that would be impossible to see without 
entering the user’s home.  As in Kyllo,230 the law holds that law 
enforcement’s obtaining such intimate details of a home is a search 
that requires a warrant.231  Since the Court held that detailed 
information collected about actions from within a home requires a 
warrant,232 the government should also obtain a warrant to search or 
seize Alexa-enabled smart home devices.  Amazon created Alexa-
enabled smart home devices for home use, and these devices record 
information about the user in his home.  The home is a constitutionally 
protected area where people have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Thus, people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their Alexa-
enabled smart home devices and their recordings.  
B. The Property-Based Trespassory Analysis Applied 
to Alexa-Enabled Smart Home Devices 
The Fourth Amendment can also protect Alexa-enabled smart 
home devices through the property based trespassory analysis of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The Court previously held that a physical trespass 
by law enforcement constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure.233  
As to the car in Jones,234 a user’s Alexa-enabled smart home device is 
personal property that should also fall under the category of effects 
listed in the amendment.235  For example, if law enforcement were to 
grab a home owner’s Alexa-enabled smart home device, this would 
constitute a trespass onto the user’s personal property.  A search 
warrant is required by law enforcement to search and seize a user’s 
Alexa enabled smart device as in Jones,236 where law enforcement 
physically occupied private property and obtained incriminating 
information.237  
Moreover, the Court explicitly left the door open for Alexa-
enabled smart devices, whose data transmission does not necessarily 
require physical trespass, for the reasonable expectation of privacy 
 
230 Id. at at 27. 
231 Id. at 40. 
232 Id. at 38. 
233 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 410 (2012). 
234 Id.  
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analysis.238  Like GPS devices, Alexa-enabled smart home devices can 
reveal a user’s daily route to work by reviewing the transcript, which 
would show how many times the user asked Alexa to check the fastest 
way to travel to work.   
Like GPS devices, Alexa can record the user’s movements, but 
in a different context.  Instead of showing a user’s location through 
signals from multiple satellites, Alexa’s recording history can show the 
user’s past movements through the aggregate collection and analysis 
of Alexa’s recording transcripts.  For example, the transcript created 
by Alexa’s continuous recording would show that the user frequently 
visited the doctor’s office by reading the transcript where the user 
asked Alexa to schedule weekly appointments in the online calendar.  
Nevertheless, law enforcement’s search of the user’s personal 
property, the Alexa-enabled smart home device, is a physical trespass 
under the Fourth Amendment that requires a search warrant.   
C. Alexa-Enabled Smart Home Devices Should be 
Treated as Cell Phones 
Under Riley,239 the Fourth Amendment applies to the search 
and seizure of a smartphone with similar abilities to Alexa-enabled 
smart home devices.240  In Riley, the Court held that law enforcement’s 
intrusion of privacy is no longer physically limited due to cell 
phones.241  Before smartphones and Alexa-enabled smart devices, law 
enforcement could only obtain limited data about an individual, let 
alone information from within his home.  Like the smartphone in Riley, 
Alexa-enabled smart home devices have massive storage capacity.   
Today, when officers obtain Alexa-enabled smart home 
devices, they see all the tasks and questions posed by the user to Alexa.  
As with smartphones, officers can obtain detailed information about 
users from their smart home devices.  For example, the recordings by 
Alexa produce transcripts that enable law enforcement to see or hear 
the conversations made during the time that a crime ensued.  If the user 
asks Alexa to search for the nearest firearms and gun store on the day 
before committing murder, that information might show that he had 
the prerequisite intent to cause the death of another person. This 
 
238 Id. at 411. 
239 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
240 Id. at 401. 
241 Id. at 394. 
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scenario is similar to how a cell phone might show law enforcement 
that the user was driving recklessly because, at the time of the accident, 
his cell phone shows he was streaming a live video on social media.  
Depending on what law enforcement finds on a smart home device 
may lead to a criminal conviction.  
Furthermore, like smartphones, the data from Alexa-enabled 
smart home devices differ from physical evidence in quantity and 
quality.  Alexa connects users to the internet and other smart devices 
and records these actions.  An internet search and browsing history can 
reveal the user’s private interest or concerns.  Alexa-enabled smart 
home devices hold many people’s private information about their lives, 
just like smartphones.  As the Court stated, “the fact that technology 
now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does 
not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which 
the Founders fought.”242  Even though people do not usually carry 
around the Alexa-enabled Echo device, it still stores and collects a 
large scale of personal information that warrants protection under the 
Fourth Amendment.  
D. The Third Party Doctrine and Alexa-Enabled 
Smart Home Devices 
The third party doctrine should not apply to prohibit people 
from claiming Fourth Amendment protection over their smart home 
devices.  The third party doctrine states that “a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”243  The law applies “even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose.”244  
Whenever a user makes a voice request, the Alexa-enabled smart home 
device records the user’s speech and stores the data on Amazon’s 
servers, or cloud system, thus possibly implicating the third party 
doctrine.  However, as in Carpenter,245 where the third party doctrine 
did not apply to the government’s seizure and search of CSLI from 
wireless carriers, the Court should rule similarly with Alexa-enabled 
smart home devices 
 
242 Id. at 403. 
243 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)). 
244 Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
245 Id. at 2206. 
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In order to function at its highest capacity, Alexa-enabled smart 
home devices need to connect wirelessly to other data networks and 
the cloud system.  Amazon’s Alexa-enabled Echo device activates 
with the wake word “Alexa”246 and immediately connects to servers or 
other smart devices to fulfill the user’s request.  The user’s voice is 
recognized by Alexa,247 which allows the device to access content on 
the internet, specifically for the user.  The data recorded is stored 
unless the user deletes it.  To illustrate, users of Amazon’s Echo device 
can manage and delete their audio recording transcripts through the 
Alexa App or by asking Alexa to delete the recordings.248  
Alexa-enabled smart home devices should overcome the 
implementation of the third party doctrine and the doctrine’s result 
because sharing information with a third party does not by itself bar it 
from Fourth Amendment protections.  As CSLI in Carpenter, the data 
collected and recorded by Alexa is detailed and automatically 
compiled.  Like CSLI, Alexa-enabled smart home devices share 
information with a third party, Amazon’s employees, to improve the 
device and delivery system.  The Court in Carpenter stated, “although 
[CSLI] records are generated for commercial purposes, that distinction 
does not negate Carpenter’s anticipation of privacy in his physical 
location.”249  A stack of Alexa’s recorded transcripts can reveal a 
user’s past physical movements and potential future appointments.  
Arguably, the third party doctrine should not apply towards 
data collected from Alexa-enabled smart devices.  Since Alexa can tell 
users the traffic conditions and inform users about the duration of their 
commute,250 a print-out of these requests would show the user’s 
location at a specific time.  For example, a month’s worth of transcripts 
containing the interactions between the user and Alexa reveals a 
detailed record of the user’s whereabouts.  CSLI can reveal when a 
person visited the doctor’s office.  However, Alexa-enabled smart 
home devices can show the same information through recordings and 
transcripts and detail the purpose of the visit.   
 
246 Weiss, supra note 2. 
247 Alexa Features: News & Information, supra note 71. 
248 Katie Conner, Here are the Best Tips for Keeping your Information Private While Using 
Alexa, CNET  https://www.cnet.com/how-to/have-amazon-echo-privacy-fears-heres-what-
you-can-do/ (Oct. 24, 2019). 
249 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
250 Alexa Features: News & Information, supra note 71. 
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More importantly, like CSLI, Alexa’s constant listening ability 
affects all users, not just those under an investigation.  As CSLI 
collects unlimited personal information about the user’s physical 
movements, Alexa-enabled devices collect significantly more detailed 
information.  Arguably, just as the wireless carriers in Carpenter were 
not typical witnesses, Amazon itself should not be considered a typical 
witness. 
On the other hand, the government could argue that the third 
party doctrine should apply to data collected from Alexa-enabled smart 
devices because people voluntarily share their recorded information 
with Amazon.  Alexa-enabled devices upload the recordings to 
Amazon’s servers, and they are used to conduct improvements on the 
devices.  Similarly, cell phones log CSLI, which are collected and 
maintained by wireless providers.  Regarding CSLI, the sharing of cell 
phone data with wireless providers is not enough to bar the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection. 
A person’s mere usage creates CSLI without taking any 
affirmative action to authorize such data collection except for 
powering up the device.251  Similarly, Alexa records a person’s 
conversations without the need for users to hit a record button 
physically.  Like cell phones, apart from shutting off the Alexa-enabled 
device, there is no way to avoid Alexa’s recording of the user’s speech.  
The Court determined in Carpenter that “in no meaningful 
sense does the user voluntarily assume the risk of turning over a 
comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”252  Contrary to 
what the government might argue, users of Alexa-enabled smart home 
devices do not voluntarily disclose the complete documentation of all 
encounters and conversations in their homes through the use of Alexa.  
Arguably, a warrant should be required when users have a legitimate 
privacy interest in records held by a third party like Amazon.  
V. REDEFINING THE TERM “EFFECTS” TO INCLUDE ALEXA-
ENABLED SMART HOME DEVICES 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
reads: 
 
251 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
252 Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularity 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.253 
This Note began by acknowledging that the framers of the 
United States Constitution did not have a reason to develop law 
concerning the government’s use of smart technology to acquire, store, 
and analyze personal information about Americans.254  When the 
founding fathers drafted and ratified the Constitution, there were no 
electronic devices such as satellites, cell sites, GPS, cell phones, or 
other smart devices.  For these reasons, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson255 
explored how the “Fourth Amendment built on old-fashioned ‘effects’ 
can address a new world in which things are no longer just inactive, 
static objects, but objects that create and communicate data with other 
things.”256  Ferguson concluded that “unless our constitutional 
understanding of an effect adapts to meet modern technology, smart 
objects will be open to warrantless searches without sufficient Fourth 
Amendment protection.”257  
Ferguson argued that the term effects under the Fourth 
Amendment should include smart objects and the related data that the 
object transmits into the “Internet of Things.”258  Thus, effects should 
encompass the smart device’s “functionality[,] including its necessary 
communication with other devices and stored data.”259  Thus, 
according to Ferguson, an effect would consist of the physical object, 
smart data, and communicating signals emanating from the device.260  
 
253 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
254  Jones, supra note 5. 
255 Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law at the University of the District of 
Columbia. 
256  Ferguson, supra note 11, at 808.  
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 813 (introducing Technologist Kevin Ashton as the person who coined the term 
‘the Internet of Things’ in 1998.  Kevin Ashton stated, “adding radio-frequency identification 
and sensors to everyday objects will create an Internet of Things, and lay the foundations of a 
new age of machine perception.”). Id. 
259 Id. at 809. 
260 Id. 
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Under Ferguson’s definition of effects, sensory-embedded 
license plates would be afforded constitutional protection from the 
term effects.261  Ferguson classified things as effects if they were  “(1) 
an identifiable object (2) that wirelessly communicates information 
about the object and (3) is linked to sensors that read information about 
the object.”262  Ferguson’s new definition of effects would cover smart 
objects that relay data to collecting sensors.263 
The term “‘effects’ in the Fourth Amendment has long been 
understood to signify the protection of personal property.”264  With this 
in mind, the Supreme Court has referenced particular objects as effects 
such as weapons and fruits of a crime,265 clothing,266 automobiles,267 
luggage,268 and other containers.  The modern-day approach to effects 
seen in Jones focused on the physical search of a car, an effect.269  
Similarly, in Riley, law enforcement searched the digital information 
stored on a smartphone, an effect.270  Ferguson determined that in 
Riley, the Court’s “distinction between physical objects and [smart] 
objects [broke] new ground for the Supreme Court, opening the door 
to perhaps a different analysis for digital information.”271 
According to Ferguson, “the appropriate analysis to determine 
whether the communication of [a smart device] can be intercepted and 
seized is whether the sensor data and signals fall within the 
constitutional interest of a smart effect.”272  Since the data and signals 
are at the core of smart devices, Ferguson argued that both should be 
considered part of the redefined Fourth Amendment term effects.273   
Sensor data and signals fall within the constitutional property 
interest of a smart device. The Fourth Amendment protects both 
tangible274 and intangible property.275  Underlying these protections 
 
261 Id. at 824. 
262 Id.  
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).  
266 See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). 
267 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
268 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
269 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). 
270 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014). 
271 Ferguson, supra note 11, at 834.  
272 Id. at 859. 
273 Id. 
274 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
275 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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over tangible and intangible property is that property is of value to the 
user.276  As Ferguson states, “the data is a valuable part of the 
ownership interest in the effect.”277  The information collected from 
smart devices is “largely private, encompassing sensitive home, 
personal travel, and health information[,] among other things.”278  
Alexa-enabled smart home devices would fall under 
Ferguson’s new definition of effects because the smart home device is 
a thing, which emanates data to Amazon’s servers and connects users 
to the internet and other smart devices.  Alexa-enabled smart home 
devices, classified under Ferguson’s definition of effects, would afford 
it constitutional protection both in the device and in its contents.  The 
constitutional property interest that users of smart devices hold is not 
just in the physical device but in the data transmitted to Amazon 
servers.  
An argument against extending the term effects to the data that 
the smart device emanates is the view that the user does not exclusively 
own the data because the user must share the data with a third party.  
In response, the Court has already determined, in regard to CSLI, that 
law enforcement needs a warrant to obtain records held by a third party 
where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information.279  Since the Court determined that law enforcement’s 
acquisition of data collected from ceaseless monitoring devices 
requires a warrant, Alexa-enabled smart home devices will similarly 
require a warrant since the transcripts from Alexa’s recordings will 
reveal a user’s past location history.   
Moreover, Ferguson purported that for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, “coownership does not remove the ability to exclude”280 data 
collected by smart home devices from government interference.  Smart 
home device owners have “a claim to control the data and a right to 
exert a measure of control excluding the government from any attempt 
at direct collection.”281  Thus, it appears that smart devices, as effects, 
should be considered among other recognized constitutionally 
protected property.282 
 
276 Ferguson, supra note 11, at 860. 
277 Id.  
278 Id. at 863. 
279 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
  280  Ferguson, supra note 11, at 861. 
281 Id.  
282 Id. at 832. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,177 (1984). 
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VI. DIGITAL CURTILAGE FRAMEWORK 
Ferguson proposed the theory of digital curtilage as a 
framework to address the advancement of technology and the concern 
over privacy rights.283  Although no court has used this framework, it 
is relevant to show that this new theory would protect smart home 
devices and their data if adopted by courts.  This Note discusses 
Ferguson’s digital curtilage framework and analyzes how it would 
protect Alexa-enabled smart home devices and their data from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.   
The principles of traditional curtilage inspired Ferguson’s 
digital curtilage framework.284  Ferguson’s digital curtilage theory 
aimed to protect “stored data and certain communication signals [that]: 
(1) are closely associated with the effect; (2) have been marked out and 
claimed as secure from others; and (3) are used to promote personal 
autonomy, family, self-expression, and association.”285  Ferguson 
holds that these factors can apply to his expanded definition of the term 
effects in the Fourth Amendment.286  For the application of digital 
curtilage towards a smart device, the “smart effect [must] include: (1) 
data and signals that are closely associated with the effect; (2) data and 
signals that have been marked out and claimed as secure from others; 
and (3) data and signals used to promote personal autonomy, family, 
self-expression, and association.”287  Ferguson’s digital curtilage, like 
traditional curtilage, provides a fact-based and balanced constitutional 
framework.288 
First, digital curtilage will apply towards a smart device that 
includes data and signals closely associated with the effect.289  Data 
stored on smart effects, like Alexa-enabled smart home devices, are 
closely associated with the device.  The user needs to connect to the 
device itself to retrieve the data from Alexa-enabled smart home 
devices.  This demonstrates the close connection between the data 
collected and the object that stores the information.  Since the data 
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Sanchez: A New Era: Digital Curtilage
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
702 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
derives from a constitutionally protected device, under Ferguson’s new 
effects definition, it benefits from the derivative protection.   
Also relevant in the digital era is the term close, which does not 
mean a physical closeness because “the fluidity of data travel, 
duplicate, and overcome physical barriers.”290  Ferguson stated, 
“because smart data is part of the thing itself, and because the thing 
was designed to communicate smart data, then the data should be 
considered closely associated with the effect itself.”291  
Moreover, the data storage and the use of the smart device 
becomes a property right which a user can control.  Ferguson believed 
that “at a minimum, consumers should be able to exclude others from 
the digital property.”292  Ferguson’s theory would cover Alexa-enabled 
devices since users can manage and delete their audio recording 
transcripts through the Alexa App or by asking Alexa to delete their 
recordings.293   
Users can make a strong claim that the data collected from the 
Alexa-enabled device is associated with the device.  The Alexa-
enabled smart home device’s purpose is to help homeowners organize 
their lives by connecting to the internet and other smart home 
appliances and applications.  Alexa-enabled smart home devices and 
the data they emanate satisfy Ferguson’s first factor to apply digital 
curtilage. Ferguson stated, “because the information comes from a 
smart device, the data will be considered a part of this smart device…in 
the same way the curtilage principle extends protection of the home 
outside the home, so digital curtilage extends protection of data outside 
the smart effect.”294  
Second, digital curtilage will apply towards a smart device that 
includes data and signals that the user marked out and claimed as 
secure from others.295  This part of the test will “narrow the scope of 
the protection for certain smart devices.”296  A user’s exclusion under 
these circumstances is evident in the steps taken to secure the smart 
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system through encryption.”297  Likewise, smartphones allow users to 
“opt out of locational tracking and other sharing requests.”298   
The “‘marked and claimed as secure’ factor requires an 
examination of how the creator of the data interacts with others seeking 
to collect data.”299  Ferguson assumed that since stored data lives 
within the effect, a presumption of security exists.300  He further stated 
that “while stored data might remain unencrypted or even unprotected, 
because of its location in an effect, it retains constitutional 
protection.”301  This assumption extends existing law that protects 
stored data in smartphones.302  Thus, under this step, courts will need 
to examine what actions users took to mark and secure the data from 
others.303 
Alexa-enabled smart home devices and the data they transmit 
satisfy Ferguson’s second factor to apply digital curtilage.  Users of 
Alexa-enabled smart home devices can raise a virtual wall to keep 
other people from accessing their stored information.  The data that 
Alexa records is stored unless the user deletes it.  A user’s affirmative 
act of deleting his Alexa audio recording transcripts by asking Alexa 
to delete his recordings will signal a desire to secure the information.  
When a user changes the wake word that triggers Alexa to respond and 
record, that is evidence that a user took an affirmative act to secure the 
device’s use and access.  
Ferguson further stated, “even if sophisticated hackers could 
thwart these types of security measures, a symbolic statement of 
security exists. After all, just because burglars and police can enter 
locked houses, it does not mean citizens lose a claim of security behind 
those walls.”304  Alexa-enabled smart home devices carry the option to 
secure the data and communications recorded by Alexa.  Thus, when 
the user takes affirmative steps to claim security in the device, this 
factor is satisfied. 
 Third, digital curtilage will apply towards a smart device that 
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self-expression, and association.305  Ferguson determined that this step 
will further refine or limit the protections afforded to these effects.306  
More importantly, “a focus on data and signals from objects linked to 
personal or private matters will limit the expanded definition [of 
Ferguson’s definition] of effects.”307 
Ferguson recognized that “[p]rotecting only personal and 
family-use data is consistent with the intent of traditional, physical 
curtilage.”308  Traditional curtilage protects areas that encourage home-
like activities.309  Similarly, in the digital context, “this understanding 
would protect expressive, associational, religious, family, personal, 
and dignity interests as opposed to unrevealing or impersonal data.”310  
Ferguson’s digital curtilage theory is subject to the same principles 
applied in traditional curtilage: 
As a result, the Fourth Amendment has been read to 
encourage an expansive vision of human development 
free from governmental surveillance. Thus, the 
personal and family interest argument should not be 
seen as a content-based test, but merely a recognition 
that many of the things we do (with or without smart 
objects) are done for personal growth and development. 
While at first blush this distinction might seem 
arbitrary, it is the same type of distinction that separates 
a protected curtilage space from an unprotected open 
field. Constitutionally protected interests are not just 
determined by property concepts (where you are 
standing) but also by privacy values and concerns about 
human autonomy that inform these conceptions of 
property (what you could be doing in that space).311 
Protecting only personal and family use data will further refine and 
limit the protections afforded to these smart effects. 
Alexa-enabled smart home devices promote personal 
autonomy, family, self-expression, and association.  Alexa recognizes 
 





310 Id. at 871. 
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its user’s voice, which allows the device to personalize the content 
shown.312  The Alexa-enabled smart home device connects users to 
their personalized choice of entertainment.  Alexa also personalizes a 
user’s daily news updates.  
Moreover, Alexa-enabled smart home devices allow users to 
communicate with anyone, anywhere, at any time.313  Without 
touching any device, users can go through a day’s worth of emails 
because Alexa can even read the user’s emails out loud.314  
Furthermore, a significant development in Amazon’s smart home 
device is its ability to handle and access a user’s patient health 
information. Thus, by design Alexa promotes personal autonomy, 
family, self-expression, and association.  
A strong argument against the theory of digital curtilage is the 
requirement that data and signals must be marked out and claimed as 
secure from others.  Unlike traditional curtilage, where people must 
physically take steps to protect the alleged curtilage area from 
observation by passersby, digital curtilage does not require tremendous 
effort to keep the data secure.  According to Ferguson’s theory, a user 
of an Alexa-enabled smart home device would only need to change its 
wake word to constitute an affirmative act of securing the data.  
The digital curtilage framework might be too lenient because it 
takes minimal action to show that the user protected the data from 
disclosure.  This theory does not take into consideration that smart 
devices connect and share information with other networks.  Many 
people download applications on their smart devices, which requires 
the dissemination of their information to make their device more 
efficient.  The requirement to secure the data embedded in smart 
devices shared with other sensor devices leads to a potential 
technological theory of the third party doctrine.  The third party 
doctrine holds that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”315  Since 
smart devices share a user’s information with other smart devices and 
other servers, the government can argue that the information is 
therefore not secured.  
 
312 Alexa Features: News & Information, supra note 71. 
313 Alexa Features: Smart Home, supra  note 67. 
314 Alexa Features: Productivity, supra note 75. 
315 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This Note demonstrated that under current Supreme Court case 
law, the Fourth Amendment might extend to the unique Alexa-enabled 
smart home devices. The Note also demonstrated that the Fourth 
Amendment’s language could, without distortion of its principles, 
adopt a modern understanding of the term “effects” to encompass the 
smart device and the data that it transmits.  
The Note also discussed digital curtilage, a new framework to 
constitutionally protect smart devices and the data they emanate from 
government interception. Although the Supreme Court of the United 
States has not ruled on the constitutionality of law enforcement’s 
obtaining Alexa-enabled smart home data, the current case law shows 
that a warrant would be required.  Based on the Supreme Court’s prior 
decisions, the Court leaves the door open for developing new theories 
to adapt to the advancement of technology. The theory of digital 
curtilage offers society a framework that integrates the nuances of 
smart technology and the Fourth Amendment. 
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